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PF603376/V1

POSSIBLE JEWISH TERRORIST  
ATTEMPTS TO ASSASSINATE  
THE FOREIGN SECRETARY.

PF603376/V1

SEE ALSO LIST INSIDE COVER

Serial No.	Star Designation	Date	Serial No.	Star Designation	Date	Serial No.	Star Designation	Date
KV2/3428								

S.1630 Edn.2

PF603376/V1



MINUTE SHEET.

Reference P.F.603,376

1

FILE DESTROYED M.F.

31.10.45 Note from B.I.B. to D.B. 1a

2

5.1.46 Cable from D.S.O. Palestine repassible assassination 2a

/3

11.1.46 To Colonial Office re 2a 3a

4

15.1.46 To Foreign Office with reference to 2a 4a

5

15.1.46 To S.B. re possibility of assassination 5a

19.1.46. From Colonial Office re Stern Group's illegal broad- 5b.

22.1.46. To Colonial Office inreply to 5b. 5c.

6

12.2.46 From D.S.O. Palesttine further to 2a 6a

7

(1889) 23796/1381  
2,000,000 1/40 JCSLAJ  
Cp644/229  
(REGIMINT)  
CODE 5-34-0

[OVER



7

14.2.46 From S.B. further to 5a

7a

8

15.2.46 To B.A.O.R. re Stern group activities.

8a

9

21.6.46 To S.B. re terrorist activities.

9a

10

25.6.46 From S.I.S. re report from Palestine.

10a

11

3.7.46 From S.I.M.E. re Sternist plot.

11a

6.7.46. To S.I.M.E. re Terrorist plot to assassinate the Foreign Secretary

11b.

12

9.7.46 To S.B. with reference to 9a

12a

13

18.7.46 From S.I.S. further to 10a

13a



14.

23.7.46. Note from D.B. (Capt. Liddell) to B.J. (Mr. Kellar) re safeguarding of Mr. Bevin from/terrorist attempts on his life. /possible 14a.

15.

24.7.46. To S.I.M.E. (tel.) re safeguarding of Mr. Bevin from possible terrorist attempts on his life. 15a.

16.

*Filed in evn - now at 11a. H.R. 22/11/46.*  
~~27.7.46. To S.I.M.E. re Terrorist plot to assassinate Foreign Secretary. 16a.~~

17.

7.7.46. Copy of cable to D.S.O. Palestine. 17a.

18.

26.7.46. Copy of cable from F.O. to Paris re safeguarding Secretary of State in Paris. 18a.

19.

26.7.46. Copy of cable from F.O. to Paris re safeguarding Secretary of State in Egypt. 19a.

20.

26.7.46. Copy of report on meeting at the F.O. re safeguarding Secretary of State in Paris against possible Terrorist attempts at assassination. 20a.

21.

29.7.46. Copy of cable from Paris to the F.O. re safeguarding of Secretary of State. 21a.

[P.T. Over]



22.

30.7.46. Tel. from S.I.M.E. in reply to 15a.

22a.

23.

31.7.46. To the F.O. with reference to 22a.

23a.

24.

3.8.46. Extract from Information from SIMZ re assassination of Mr Bevin.

24a.

25.

17.8.46. Copy of cable from S. of S. Colonies to Palestine

25a.



Original in S.F.53/8/72(1)  
Copy for PF.603376

COPY

75156/151K/46

Cypher (O.T.P.)

To: Palestine (General Sir A. Cunningham)  
From: S. of S. Colonies.

Sent 17th August, 1946. 14.00 hrs.

IMMEDIATE

No. 1511 Top Secret

I have been approached by C.I.D. concerning desirability of furnishing full information as to presence in Paris during Peace Conference of any persons connected with Jewish illegal organisations. Understand that C.I.D. are approaching Giles direct for such information as may be available.

2. It has been suggested that presence of Palestine C.I.D. officer in Paris to co-operate with Special Branch in this matter would be of security value during presence of Cabinet Ministers in Paris.

3. I appreciate that in present circumstances this suggestion may be difficult to fulfill but I shall be grateful for any assistance you may feel able to give.

---

Distributed to:-

M.S.25  
Secretary of State  
Sir G. Gater  
Sir A. Dawe  
New Scotland Yard  
M.I.5  
Foreign Office

Mr. Martin  
Sir D. Harris  
Mr. Trafford Smith  
Mr. Mathieson  
Mr. Clark  
Mr. R.M. Howe  
Mr. A.J. Keller  
Private Secretary

100/100  
27 8 46



B3A 17/6.

(42)  
24A

EXTRACT.

Extract for File No.: PF 603,376. Y. Box. Name: .....

Original in File No.: OF 85/22. Serial: ..... Dated: 3(?) .8.46.

Original from: SIME. Under Ref: SIME/009/135/234/B. 2.8.46.

Extracted on: 14.8.46. by: JM. Section: R.7.

The following is an extract from information from SIME headed  
"Possibility of Jewish Terrorist Outrages outside Palestine".

.....

4. ....Several agents have reported that Jewish terrorists have had  
the assassination of Mr. Bevin under consideration for some time, and that they  
have prepared a plan for carrying out the outrage, if necessary, in the United  
Kingdom.

.....

2/8/46  
19.8.46



23a

B. 3a/Gen/RT(D.B.)

31st July 1946

Dear Harold

You will remember that we discussed last week the possible danger of an attempt being made on the life of the Foreign Secretary, should he go to Egypt for the signature of the Treaty, and we agreed I should ask Roberts of S.I.M.E. to let us have his views.

Roberts now informs us he has discussed with Bowker F.O. telegram to Alexandria No. 44 of 24th July on the subject. He comments that the likelihood of a terrorist attempt on the Foreign Secretary's life, should he visit Egypt, is almost a topic of household conversation in the Middle East, but that the Egyptian police are well-informed as to the intentions of the various Egyptian organisations suspected and would take ruthless action should an outrage seem imminent. He is of the opinion that the danger of an attack by Egyptian terrorists is diminished by the fact that the Foreign Secretary would presumably only go to Egypt on the conclusion of the negotiations and that the main interest of political factions opposing the Treaty is to sabotage the negotiations while they are in progress, rather than to go to the length of assassination when they are terminated.

Our own impression here, however, is that the more dangerous of the Egyptian terrorists at large are so strongly nationalist in their views that it is unlikely they would be diverted from their activities by anything other than the immediate recognition of the most extreme Egyptian claims.

Roberts also discusses the danger of an attack by Jewish terrorists, which he considers to have been lessened by the reduction of the Jewish forces in Egypt, by Egyptian restrictions on travel facilities to Jewish civilians and by the deterrent effect which the recent King David Hotel outrage will have on any Jews who

Harold Caccia, Esq., C.M.G.,  
Foreign Office.

/previously

33a/85  
15/8



previously might have afforded shelter to potential terrorists. On the other hand, Roberts also points out that the information and co-operation which the Jewish Agency might provide could not be as satisfactory as it was after the Moyne murder. Moreover, the Jewish terrorist organisations contain a number of Eastern Jews who can easily pass as Arabs, and are therefore to some extent able to avoid the strict frontier controls in the Suez area. In this connection it is of interest that certain Jewish terrorists, who were reported in Cairo a fortnight ago, now seem to have disappeared.

Despite the above considerations and the very great difficulties inherent in providing full protection against any determined assassin who has good information of the movements of his intended victim, Roberts feels that the dangers could be sufficiently met by the following precautions. No prior announcement should be made of the exact date of the Foreign Secretary's arrival, and his stay should be limited to two or three days. While in Egypt, he should reside at the British Embassy in Alexandria, and as few State visits as possible arranged. The security precautions taken at the Embassy should be similar to those adopted at Mena House for the conference of 1943. In this connection, Roberts proposes that Major Sansom, who was in charge then, should again be made sole security officer responsible. No co-operation from the Egyptians would be necessary for the protection of the Embassy building, which would be guarded by British troops, with Field Security in charge of all entrances.

As regards any engagements which the Secretary of State might undertake outside the Embassy compound, responsibility for his security would, of course, rest primarily with the Egyptians. Very close liaison would, however, be maintained with the Egyptian Police to ensure that all premises which the Foreign Secretary visited would be adequately searched and agitators satisfactorily isolated for the period of the visit. Roads would be

/lined



- 3 -

lined with Egyptian troops and police facing towards the crowd. In addition to an Egyptian escort, the Foreign Secretary would also be provided with a British escort in jeeps, armed with automatic weapons. As soon as the timings of the visit were available, it would be possible to work-out with the Egyptian authorities a 'cover' plan for guarding routes to airfields and buildings which, in fact, were not to be used.

Roberts finally points out that, as the Secretary of State's visit has been mooted for some time and has already been the subject of unofficial conversations, there would be little danger in opening discussions at once on the projected visit with certain picked officials, such as Hassan Rifaat Pasha (Under-Secretary of the Interior) and Gazali Bey (Director-General of Public Security). The details of the 'cover' plan could also be restricted to this level, to limit the possibility of subordinate officials ascertaining what the real arrangements might be.

Roberts has, of course, as yet taken no steps to implement the above proposals, but has asked for as early instructions as possible, and I would, accordingly, be most grateful for your views on the matter so that I can signal a reply.

Yours ever  
Gresh



# SECRET TELEGRAM RECEIVED IN CIPHER

From : SDME Office File No. B3/Gen/AJK Originator's No. 712/8  
 Passed for DDB Date of Origin 27.7.46.  
 Action to DDB repeated 30.7.46.  
 Date of Receipt 30.7.46.  
 Copies to DDB Deciphered by A.7.

MOST  
IMMEDIATE.

TOPSECRET and strictly personal for LIDDELL from ROBERTS.

Your DS/2078 of July 24th concerning Foreign Secretary's visit to Egypt.

- (1) Have now seen and discussed with BOWKER Foreign Office cipher to Alexandria number 44 of July 24th.
- (2) Likelihood of terrorist attack on Foreign Secretary during proposed visit to Egypt is almost household word in Middle East.
- (3) As Foreign Secretary will presumably only be coming to Egypt on conclusion of Treaty Negotiations consider dangers from Egyptian terrorists small. Although certain political factions might wish sabotage Negotiations consider they would not at present continue to lengths of political assassination. In any case Egyptian police are well informed on intentions

The text of this telegram is Unparaphrased, and must not be distributed outside British Government Departments or Headquarters, or re-transmitted, even in cipher, without being Paraphrased. Messages marked 'O.T.P.' need not be paraphrased.

83a/95



SECRET TELEGRAM RECEIVED IN CAIRO

of Egyptian organisations and will certainly take ruthless action in the event any suspicions of plans for outrages this sort.

(4) Possibility of Jewish terrorists acts in Egypt diminished recently by (a) reduction in Jewish forces in the country. (b) Egyptian restrictions on issue of travel facilities to Jewish civilians. (c) since attack on King David Jewish civilians are even less likely give shelter to suspicious Jews who might be planning outrages.

Against this (a) Jewish Agency information source is not so good nor is co-operation so satisfactory as after MOYNE murder. (b) Terrorist gangs include number of Eastern Jew who can easily pass as Arabs, thereby avoiding strict frontier controls on Suez to some extent. (c) Certain Jewish terrorists reported to have been in CAIRO a fortnight ago and now to have disappeared. This being investigated.

(5) Despite foregoing and recognising that little protection can be afforded against determined assassin who has good information on movements of intended victim, consider possibility can be satisfactorily countered by following measures. (a) No prior announcement of exact date of arrival. (b) Stay to be limited to 2 or 3 days. (c) Foreign Secretary to stay at British Embassy ALEXANDRIA and fewest State visits to be arranged. (d) Arrangements at Embassy to be similar to those adopted at MENA for Prime Minister conference in 1943. Propose appoint as sole responsible security officer Major SANSOM of Field Security who was in charge 1943 arrangements. No Egyptian co-operation necessary for arrangement (gross corrupt) Embassy building. Embassy to be guarded by British troops with Field Security in charge all entrances.

/(e) for



# SECRET TELEGRAM RECEIVED IN CIPHER

From: \_\_\_\_\_ Office File No. \_\_\_\_\_ Originator's No. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Passed for \_\_\_\_\_ Date of Origin \_\_\_\_\_  
 Action to \_\_\_\_\_ Date of Receipt \_\_\_\_\_  
continuation. Copies to \_\_\_\_\_ Deciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

(e) For appointments outside Embassy Security responsibility must be primarily Egyptian. We will of course maintain closest liaison with police Egypt satisfied ourselves that all premises to be visited giving adequate search agitators are satisfactorily isolated throughout period of Foreign Secretary's visit. Roads to be lined with Egyptian (Troops ?) and Police facing the crowd. In addition to Egyptian escort Foreign Secretary will be provided with British escort in jeeps and armed with automatic weapons.

(6) When timings of visit are available (gr corrupt) work out with Egyptian authorities cover sketch providing for guarding of aerodrome routes and buildings which are not in fact to be used.

(7) Your para 4. As visit has been mooted for some time and has already been subject of unofficial conversations in which Egyptians have expressed their fears consider little danger to security in immediate discussion of projected visit with certain selected officials e.g. Under Secretary of Interior, SDE D.G. Public

The text of this telegram is Unparaphrased, and must not be distributed outside British Government Departments or Headquarters, or re-transmitted, even in cipher, without being Paraphrased. Messages marked 'O.T.P.' need not be paraphrased.

(1399) WL13901/Lon/C/198 20,000 5/46 A&E.W.L.M. Op.498 1.7281

*Handwritten:* Mubarak  
Gazal Bay



(8) Would appreciate your instructions in this respect earliest. Meanwhile will take no action.

[illegible]



[CYFILR]

21a  
P R I S E C

PARIS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to Conference of  
Foreign Ministers)

No. 395  
26th July, 1946

D. 10.55 p.m. 26th July, 1946  
R. 11.05 p.m. 26th July, 1946

aaaaaaa

IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET

Following from Codrington for Dixon.

Conferences with Sûreté, protocol and hotel management  
have produced the following.

1. Counting out personnel of Delegations and also tenants of apartments there will only be about twenty or twenty-five civil occupants, most of whom are well known, and all of whom will be screened.
2. No new occupants will be accepted except on police clearance of their record.
3. Restaurant will be closed to all except residents and their own personal guests personally conducted by them.
4. Lounge at the foot of main stair will be closed.
5. Clients to the bar will be confined within the actual bar itself, to which they will only have access through main hotel entrance hall where will be permanent police screening.
6. Entry to the hotel will be confined to residents and those whom police satisfy themselves can be admitted.
7. Entry to floors will be confined to those holding passes.
8. Goods and containers brought in for hotel service will be examined by police on arrival and parcels for residents will be held by police and claimed from them by their addressees.
9. French plain clothes police will be infiltrated with hotel staff and specific police posts including access from lifts and stairs and garden court will be manned continuously.



- 2 -

10. Sûreté have asked that in addition to Minikin, Masey and Kirsopp, who have specific work to do, there be a representative of Scotland Yard here working with the Sûreté man in charge of the hotel. This has now been arranged.

11. All the above arrangements will be put into force forenoon 28th July.

12. Thompson (representing Burt) considers that all the above so reduce our risk as to warrant our accepting and accordingly I have agreed.

O.T.P.



OUTWARD TELEGRAM

Received 26/7/46  
in 115'

[CYPHER]

P R I S E C

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO ALEXANDRIA

No. 44  
24th July, 1946

D. 9.25 p.m. 24th July, 1946

ddddddd

IMMEDIATE

DEDIP

SECRET

My telegram No. 14 [of 22nd July: Secretary of State's visit to Egypt].

Following from Dixon.

Since sending my telegram under reference I have seen your undated personal letter to Sargent RJB/EGC. This we feel alters the whole picture. It is tantamount to an admission by the Egyptian Government that they feel incapable of protecting the Secretary of State against Jewish terrorist activities. According to our information there cannot be certainty either that the Egyptian Government will be able to control Egyptian terrorist elements. The latest outrage in Jerusalem and Lord Moyne's murder show that the possibility of an attempt on the Secretary of State must be taken with all seriousness.

2. This being so, we feel that there are only two safe courses. The best would be for the Secretary of State to remain on board His Majesty's ship in Alexandria harbour. This would have obvious inconveniences from the political point of view in that the Egyptians would have to come to the Secretary of State on board ship as the essence of the plan would be that he should not land in Alexandria at all. Against this, however, it must be remembered that the Secretary of State is paying Egypt a great compliment in going to Alexandria and in withdrawing from the Peace Conference, and surely that should be enough to assuage any Egyptian touchiness. Moreover President Roosevelt stayed on board United States cruiser in 1944.

3./



- 2 -

3. The other possible course is for the Secretary of State to land at and stay in an area occupied by British troops. But this has obvious political disadvantages and would be unsuitable from the point of view of climate and health. We therefore prefer the first alternative.

4. We presume that on the security aspect you are in touch with head of S.I.M.E. with whom M.I.5 are communicating.

5. You will no doubt judge when the moment has come to inform Sidki of these plans.

O.T.P.



TOP SECRET

A Meeting was held in Mr. Howe's room on July 24th to discuss security arrangements for the U.K. Delegation to the Peace Conference in Paris.

There were present:-

Mr. Howe  
Mr. Dixon  
Col. Codrington  
Mr. Halford  
Mr. Keller (S.I.S.)  
Mr. Burt (Special Branch)

1. The Meeting was agreed that, in view of the Jerusalem outrage and other reports received of terrorist activities, the problem of the personal security of the Secretary of State and of the security of the U.K. Delegation as a whole had become one of vital importance and that a risk existed which it was essential to anticipate and seek to neutralize.

2. PARIS.

Colonel Codrington described the lay-out of the Georges Cinq Hotel and revealed that the French Government proposed to house in it in addition to the U.K. Delegation, the Chinese and Brazilian Delegations. There would also be one or two floors open to the general public and the top two floors of the hotel were occupied by flats. Furthermore, the public were given free access to the American Bar, the Restaurant, the barber's shop and the ballroom on the ground floor. It was clear that this state of affairs was unsatisfactory and the Meeting concluded that the first thing to go for was to ask the French Government to have the hotel closed entirely to the public. Nothing could be done to remove the tenants of the flats on the top floors, but the French Security Police could be asked to vet them carefully. It was anticipated that the French authorities would see the gravest objection to evacuating the whole hotel, but, as a counter-measure, it was suggested that the vacant suites and rooms might be filled up with some other delegation or delegations. If this were done, the French Security Police could be responsible for the general security of the building and the various delegations could, no doubt, come to some mutual arrangement for the security of the floors which they occupied.

It was agreed -

(i) that Mr. Dixon should immediately send a telegram to Mr. Ashley Clarke informing him of this suggestion and asking him to approach the French at once.

(ii) That Colonel Codrington should go to Paris on July 25th accompanied by a member of the Special Branch and a security officer (Mr. Cockburn?) to settle the details with the French. The security officer would remain in Paris for the duration of the Conference in order to coordinate the arrangements and supervise them.

(iii) That/ 330/85



(iii) That Colonel Codrington should be responsible for the coordination of arrangements in the Foreign Office on his return, and (on the proposal of Mr. Kellar) that an officer from M.I.6. (Mr. Collard) should be seconded to the Foreign Office for, say, ten days or a fortnight until someone else could be found in order to assist Colonel Codrington on the technical aspects of the problem.

3. The Meeting considered that the French authorities would almost certainly see the gravest objection to the plan outlined in paragraph 2. above. It was therefore necessary to think of alternative plans. It would be possible for the Secretary of State to stay in the Embassy, but there were objections to his doing so:-

- (a) The Secretary of State was personally opposed to this course.
- (b) The security of the delegation as a whole would still not be provided for, and
- (c) The work of the Delegation would become extremely difficult if the Secretary of State was not immediately available for consultation at all hours of the day and night.

Another alternative would be for the Secretary of State and the whole Delegation to be housed in a self-contained house or villa on the outskirts of Paris and it was thought that the French authorities might be prepared to agree to this, since it would mean that the accommodation in the Georges Cinq Hotel would become available for them for other purposes. It was agreed that Colonel Codrington should inform Mr. Ashley Clarke of these alternatives but that they should not be mentioned to the French authorities in the first instance.

4. The meeting drew attention to a number of practical steps which would be necessary, e.g.,

- (a) Instructions to the Secretary of State's driver to vary the route from the hotel to the Luxembourg Palace;
- (b) Posting of guards by night on the terrace outside the Secretary of State's suite;
- (c) guarding of all entrances to the hotel, including the basement;
- (d) vetting of the French domestic staff of the hotel.

5. EGYPT.

The Meeting also discussed the problem of the Secretary of State's proposed visit to Egypt and Mr. Kellar read out a telegram which had been despatched to the British Security authorities in the Middle East asking for their assessment of the risk to which the Secretary of State would be exposed if he went there. Mr. Kellar added that, in addition to the Jewish terrorist elements, there were also Egyptian associations who were equally likely to attempt an outrage. Mr. Dixon gave as

his opinion/



his opinion that the Secretary of State should either stay aboard a British man-of-war, or stay in some area occupied by British troops in Egypt, or not go to Egypt at all.

It was agreed -

That these considerations should be put to Sir R. Campbell.

25th July 1946.



## OUTWARD TELEGRAM

Received in 1891  
26/7

[CYPHER]

P R I S E C

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO PARIS (EMBASSY)

No. 628  
24th July, 1946

D. 9.25 p.m. 24th July, 1946

ddddddd

IMMEDIATE

DEDIP

TOP SECRET

Following for Ashley Clarke from Dixon.

We have been reviewing question of security of the Secretary of State and United Kingdom Delegation to the Peace Conference in the light of the danger of Jewish terrorist attacks. Outrage at St. David's Hotel in Jerusalem and information which has now reached us regarding Jewish terrorist preparations in France convince us that this danger cannot be disregarded.

2. In the light of this danger existing conditions at the Hotel George V are extremely unsatisfactory. We are advised that to give us minimum security it is essential that the hotel should be closed to the general public with the exception of the tenants of the apartments. This would mean evicting the members of the public from the hotel rooms which they at present occupy, closing the public dining-room, bars, dancing-rooms, barber's shop etc. We recognise that it would be physically impossible to evict tenants of the apartments, but we should require facilities for a security check on them. We should also require facilities for security check on the French domestic staff and intend to strengthen the number of the British Security guards in order to ensure that all entrances and exits to the hotel are covered. Finally, we intend to introduce a system of passes in conjunction with the French Security authorities.

3. We recognise that these requests will be extremely inconvenient to the French Government in view of the great difficulties they are experiencing in finding accommodation for the delegations to the Peace Conference. We feel sure, however, that in the light of the serious view which we take of the danger to the Secretary of State and the Delegation, they will meet us in this matter. If it would help, we should be prepared to agree that the accommodation vacated

by/



## OUTWARD TELEGRAM

- 2 -

by members of the public should be offered to other visiting delegations, though we should like to have a say in the choice of those delegations.

4. Colonel Codrington, head of Conference Department, and two members of the Special Branch, Scotland Yard, are proceeding to Paris by air tomorrow morning, 25th July in order to discuss the position with the French authorities. We shall be grateful if, in the meantime, you will prepare the way in the highest quarters and if possible arrange for Colonel Codrington and his assistants to see the competent official at the Quai d'Orsay in company with yourself.

O.T.P.



Ref: S.F.210/U.K.  
COPY FOR: ~~C. P. 210/211~~ <sup>7th Pl</sup> PF 603,376  
COPY IN: S.F.210/Palestine.  
TO: SLU Jerusalem repeated Cairo.

Held 179  
R34.

PERSONAL for ISHAM repeated OLDPINID.

Reference your BRAH/YD.629 of 23.7.46 para.3.

1. Evidence insufficient to justify action in London of type suggested.
2. Have discussed with Colonial Office who agree. Special Branch also in agreement.



Form 98.

**SECRET TELEGRAM FOR DESPATCH IN CIPHER** / 59

TOP SECRET IMMEDIATE

Office File No. B. 3/Gen/AJK Section of Origin B. 3/AJK

Date 21.7.46 Signed [Signature]

To: S.I.M.F.

Copy to.....

Reference your letter No..... of.....  
our telegram

Strictly Personal for ROBERTS from LINDELL.

1. Foreign Office have invited our views regarding possibility of attempt being made on life of Foreign Secretary should he go to Egypt at some future date as yet unspecified to sign Anglo-Egyptian Treaty.

2. It would seem there is very real danger that such an attempt might be made by either Arab or Jewish terrorists. Gratefully therefore for earliest expression your views. You will doubtless wish to consult Jenkins.

3. Should you consider Foreign Secretary's life can be adequately safeguarded, please indicate extent of co-operation you would propose to have with Egyptian Police and precise security measures to be adopted. We should particularly like to know form personal bodyguard would take and its size and equipment.

4. Please confine your consultations on this matter to the most limited circle possible as of utmost importance that nothing should become locally known of

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P.T.O.

83915



SECRET TELEGRAM FOR DESPATCH IN OTHER

possible visit or that we are apprehensive about Foreign Secretary's safety.  
You should not, of course, at this stage raise matter with Egyptian police.

(From SIME's reply at 229  
this would appear to  
be DS/2078)



C.R. No. **TOP SECRET**

MINUTE SHEET No. 149


B.J., Mr. Kellar.

Harold Caccia spoke to me this morning about the possibility of the Foreign Secretary going to Egypt, at some future date unspecified, to sign the Egyptian Treaty. He was apprehensive about a possible attempt on the Foreign Secretary's life and wanted to know our reactions. I said that there would obviously be considerable danger of an attempt on his life, either by Parties opposed to the Treaty or by the Irgun or Stern, and that while the Egyptian authorities would be anxious to prevent any such incident, recent events have shown that they might not be able to do a great deal. The fact was that if a fanatic intended to carry out an assassination and was prepared to disregard his own safety, there would be very little that he could not do.

After consulting Orme, Sargent, Caccia asked if we would get the opinion of Douglas Roberts, presumably in conjunction with Jenkins, as to whether it was really advisable for the Foreign Secretary to go at all. He was particularly anxious that the matter should be confined to the most limited circles possible, as it was of the utmost importance that nothing should get around about a possible visit or that we were apprehensive about the Foreign Secretary's safety. Any telegrams sent should, therefore, be of the "for your eyes only" variety.

If I am away and a reply comes, perhaps you would have a word with Harold Caccia.

D.B.  
23.7.46.





SECRET TELEGRAM FOR DESPATCH IN CIPHER

possible visit or that we are apprehensive about Foreign Secretary's safety. You should not, of course, at this stage raise matter with Egyptian police.

(From SIME's reply at 229  
this would appear to  
be DS/2078)



Secret.

In reply, state NUMBER and DATE

dated 17.7.46.

Dear Captain Liddell,

Please refer to our [redacted] of 25.6.46.

We have very little to add to this information.

It is reported that the plot to assassinate Mr. Bevin  
was hatched by representatives of the IRGUN ZVI LEUMI  
and the STERN gang, who met and arranged that it should  
be carried out by sympathisers who are connected with  
the Revisionist newspaper printed in Manchester. These  
sympathisers were not named.

This should not be regarded as confirmation of  
our previous letter, but as a slight amplification by  
the same source.

Yours sincerely,

THIS IS A COPY  
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED  
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION  
3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS  
ACT 1958 JUNE 2010

for H. A. R. Philby.

Captain Guy Liddell,  
M.I.5.

ENCL. [initials]  
18 JUL 1948  
TO DB  
REF.



13a

5.

Please copy or extract flagged  
serials and put into new file  
entitled "Security precautions against  
possible Jewish Terrorist attempt to  
assassinate Foreign Secretary" (See  
also O.F.85/22 and O.F.85/22(1)).

Kindly return to me as soon as  
completed. I would appreciate it if  
you could let me know by phone when  
the new file will be ready.

B.3.a.  
25.7.46.

H.J. Seager.

H.J. Seager.

105  
277

NAME LOOKED UP.	RESULT OF LOOK-UP.	FILE Herewith ✓ or OUT to --
IRGUN ZVI LEUMI.	IRGUN ZVI LEUMI B'ERETZ ISRAEL OF OF. 608/1. Y Box 6222	Held R34 BSA 11/7
STERN GANG	@ STERN GROUP @ IRGUN ZVI LE-UMI B'ISRAEL OF 606/1 Y Box 6221	Held R34
Looked up by: <i>Bml</i> Date: <i>18/7</i>		Conn. by: Date:



TOP SECRET & PERSONAL

12a

OF. 85/22/1/B. 3a

9th July, 1946.

Dear Burt,

I refer to Robertson's OF. 607/1/Link of 21st June, 1946, in which he advised you that, in the opinion of both the Palestine C.I.D. and our own representative, it is not unlikely that, in view of recent developments in Palestine, the risk of a Terrorist attack on the Foreign Secretary may have increased.

We have now received a further report from a Palestine source that a group of Revisionists are planning the assassination of Mr. Bevin. The source is himself a former member of the BETAR (Revisionist Youth Group) and was at one time an associate of the Stern Group.

It is not at present quite clear from our source's information whether or not the Revisionist Group in question is centred in Palestine; it would seem implied that they may be in this country. The source is being approached, however, for further detail, and I shall keep you informed if anything new comes to light.

Yours sincerely,

A.J. Keller.

Deputy Commander Burt,  
Special Branch,  
New Scotland Yard.

Copy to: Mr. Bromley,  
Foreign Office.



Copy in SL.218/UK.

Secret.

PF 603,356  
O.D. 25/22/1 (D.3a)

B3H 11/1/12

67.46

S.I.M.E.

Terrorist plot to assassinate  
Foreign Secretary

Reference your 630/8 of 2.7.46. (not to DSO Palestine) in which you advise us to see [redacted] signal No.506 (not 507 as received in your signal) of 22.6.46. concerning the STERN Group's plot to assassinate the Foreign Secretary.

The contents of [redacted] signal had already been passed to us and Special Branch, New Scotland Yard and the Foreign Office have again been warned to keep this possibility in mind.

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B39/15  
15/16



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S. Form 100.

**SECRET TELEGRAM RECEIVED IN CIPHER** 11a

From : S.I.M.E. Office File No. p.o. OF 85/22/1 Originator's No. 630/9  
Passed for Action to B.3.a. Date of Origin 2.7.46  
Date of Receipt 3.7.46  
Copies to Deciphered by E.B.C.

Secret for KELLAR from OLDFIELD.

You should see [redacted] signal number 506 of June 22nd concerning STERNIST plot to assassinate Foreign Secretary.

**O.T.P.**

The text of this telegram is Unparaphrased, and must not be distributed outside British Government Departments or Headquarters, or re-transmitted, even in cipher, without being Paraphrased. Messages marked 'O.T.P.' need not be paraphrased.  
(31389) WL13001/Lon/C/198 20,000 6/46 A.&E.W.Ltd. Gp.498 J.7261



1/9

Copy to D.S.O. Palestine

dy 50

- 2 -

Our records show, the first-named is still in B.A.O.R. and the second has been released in the Middle East.

M.I.6. state they are continuing their enquiries and will keep us advised. We would appreciate your comments and any further information you may obtain on this matter.

Hd.

6-7-46

H.J. Seager.

Copy to D.S.O. Palestine.



NAME LOOKED UP.	RESULT OF LOOK-UP.	FILE Herewith ✓ or OUT to --
	DEF on this day	

**Secret.**

In reply, state NUMBER and DATE.

102

dated 25.6.46.

have

JB

1-30 ✓

Copy in CF 31/26.  
P.A. CF 35/22/1

Dear Liddell,

We have had a report from Palestine that a group of Revisionists are planning the assassination of Mr. Bevin. We know nothing about this group, except that they are said to be responsible for the publication of a Revisionist newspaper printed in Manchester. — ? N 20 of 25 Manchester Sq. W.I.

Yours sincerely,

H. A. R. Philby

Captain Guy Liddell,  
M.I.5.

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Copy to Mr. Brerley, P.O.

COPY

CA.

Copy in OP.85/22/1

SF.85/1/10

TOP SECRET

OP.667/1.Link/B.3a/JCR

21st June, 1946.

Dear Mr. Burt,

Our Palestine representative has informed us that, according to C.I.D. reports received there, the present intensification of terrorist activities may in part be due to certain recent events in the political world, of which one of the most important has been Mr. Bevin's speech at Bournemouth. This speech is stated to have caused considerable bitterness among the Jewish community in Palestine. A typical Jewish "man in the street", for example, described the speech as the most anti-Semitic ever delivered by a British statesman.

In the opinion both of the Palestine C.I.D. and our own representative, it is likely that the risk of some form of terrorist attack on the Foreign Secretary may have increased as a result of his Bournemouth speech.

I informed Superintendent Thompson of the essentials of this letter by telephone to-day.

Yours sincerely,

J.C. Robertson.

Deputy Commander Burt,  
Special Branch,  
New Scotland Yard.

*[Handwritten signature]*



~~TOP SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COPY FOR:- O.F.85/22(1)

COPY IN:- S.F.85/1/45

8

S.F.57/2/11(2)/S.16/302.

15th February, 1946.

Dear

Irving has no doubt told you of my telephone conversation with him this afternoon, in which I referred to increased recent reports of a possible extension of Stern Group activities outside Palestine.

We have in the past had a number of reports from Palestine, some of them probably based on little more than rumour. The latest news, however, seems rather more concrete. According to a telegram received on February 12th from the D.S.O Palestine, the Palestine C.I.O. have information from a source described as "reliable" that the Stern Group are training members to go to England for the purpose of assassinating members of His Majesty's Government, the Foreign Secretary being especially mentioned.

You should also know that an illegal Stern Group broadcast, on December 17th, included a violent denunciation of the Anglo-American Enquiry Commission. A typical excerpt was: "The Enquiry Commission will come, and the Hebrew Fighters will appear.....we shall speak to them in our own language - the language of the Hebrew Fighter." This threat would appear to be of local (Palestinian) application, but is perhaps worth your bearing in mind.

As a result of the report to which I have referred in para 2 of this letter, the Home Office have asked us to "tighten up", in so far as this is possible, the existing security arrangements in regard to Jewish terrorists. In these circumstances, as I explained to Irving, we should be grateful if you would do all you can to ensure the strict application of the existing precautionary regulation in regard to leave and absenteeism from the Jewish Brigade. You will appreciate that we want no Jewish Brigade soldier here, except on genuinely extreme compassionate grounds.

Yours

Brigadier E.R. Haylor.  
Intelligence Bureau.  
C.C.O (B.E)  
c/c O.S.I.  
HQ., B.A.O.R.

Th

JCR/PBG.

100 26



OF 55/22

see my DSO/383 of January 26th.

5. reports STERN Group leaders still in Jerusalem, which lends point to report mentioned in para 2 above.

TOP SECRET & PERSONAL

Copy in OF-606/1.

70

OF.85/22(1)/B.1b

14th February, 1946.

Dear Canning,

In my letter (OF.85/22(1)/DB) of 15th January, 1946, I drew your attention to a report which we had received from Palestine, indicating the possibility of an assassination being carried out by the Stern Group outside the borders of Palestine itself. The Foreign Secretary was mentioned as a possible victim.

Our Palestine representative now informs us that a similar report has been received by the Palestine C.I.D., from sources described as "reliable". According to this report, the Stern Group are training members for the purpose of sending them to the United Kingdom to assassinate members of His Majesty's Government, Mr. Devin being especially mentioned.

Our representative considers that the recently reported presence of leaders of the Stern Group in Jerusalem may add some support to this account of special training activities. He adds that the Group is receiving a steady flow of recruits, its present strength being estimated by the C.I.D. at five hundred.

The Foreign Office and Colonial Office have been informed.

Yours sincerely,

G.M. Liddell.

A. Canning, Esq.,  
Deputy Assistant Commissioner,  
Special Branch,  
New Scotland Yard.

19 Feb 1946

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S. Form 100.

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Plan Gov m of 25/22  
of — /1

URGENT

6a

# SECRET TELEGRAM RECEIVED IN CIPHER

From : D.S.O. Palestine Office File No. Originator's No. D.S.O. 409

Passed for Action to B. 1. B. Date of Origin 11.2.46.  
Date of Receipt 12.2.46.  
Copies to 0-6. Deciphered by PAP

Personal for Kellar repeated Roberts from Isham.

Further to my DSO/248 of October 26th 1945.

1. C.I.D. have received report from reliable sources that STERN Group are training members to go to England to assassinate members of His Majesty's Government especially Mr. Bevin.

2. Same source responsible for report mentioned in my telegram DS(P)97 of 7th February.

3. STERN further reported to be receiving practical sympathy from important Jews Palestine.

4. A steady flow of recruits for STERN being received. In this connection

The text of this telegram is Unparaphrased, and must not be distributed outside British Government Departments or Headquarters, or re-transmitted, even in cipher, without being Paraphrased. Messages marked 'O.T.P.' need not be paraphrased.

(30046) W1.35323/Lon/C/174 10.000 11/45 A. & E.W.Ltd. Op.695 J.7261

Amtd  
12.2.46



SECRET & PERSONAL.

5C  
32A

O.F.35/22(1)/B.1.B.

22nd January, 1946.

Dear Martin,

31A  
Thank you for your letter C.10(J)6 of 19th January, with which was enclosed a copy of your letter of the same date to the Secretary of the Anglo-American Committee.

With reference to the second paragraph of your letter to myself, the information to which you refer was passed to Bramley at the Foreign Office on January 15th. I am sorry that you were not informed of this at the time.

Yours sincerely,

Sgd. A.J. Kellar.

A.J. Kellar.

J.M. Martin Esq., C.B., C.V.O.,  
Colonial Office.  
Colonial

✓ R

BIO  
42  
22/1/46



Plumage no OF 85/22/1

Downing Street,  
S.W.1.

19th January, 1946.

C.10(J)6.  
TOP SECRET  
& PERSONAL

286  
PF 603376

My dear Kellas,

With reference to your letter to Trafford Smith of 11th January, No. O.F.60/1/B.1.b, I enclose a copy of a letter I have sent to the Secretary of the Anglo-American Committee about the Stern Group's illegal broadcast on December 17th.

We feel that the Foreign Office ought to be informed of the threat referred to in paragraph 3 of your letter. If this has not already been done, perhaps you would be good enough to convey the information to the proper authority in that Department.

Yours sincerely,

J. R. Kellas

A. J. KELLAR, ESQ.

31/1  
22/1



TOP SECRET

Copy in SF.606/1.

5G

15th January 1946

SF.85/22(1)/BIS.

Dear Canning,

You will remember that I wrote to you on November 3rd, 1945, (my letter SF.85/1/45/1B) informing you of the possibility that the STERN Group might attempt to extend their policy of assassination outside the borders of Palestine. I referred to a report which we received from our representative in Palestine at the end of October to the effect that the STERN Group were proposing "to carry out the assassination of important personages in England". According to a later report from our Palestine representative, the expression "important personages" referred most probably to principal British supporters of the Arab cause, such as Major General Spears, and not to Cabinet Ministers. Our representative commented at the time that the report might well be no more than a repetition of former rumours on the same subject.

We have now had a further report from Palestine, suggesting the Foreign Secretary as a possible object of the Stern Group's attentions. This report comes from a Top Secret source, distinct from that from which the information which I have quoted above was obtained. The information obtained from this source has hitherto proved in the main reliable.

The Foreign Office and Colonial Office have been informed.

A. Canning, Esq.,  
Deputy Assistant Commissioner,  
Special Branch.

Yours sincerely,

Sgd.

G. M. Laddell.



Ha.

8<sup>n</sup>.85/22(1,1/0.1.0.0/0.0.0)

15th January, 1946.

I think it right that you should know that we have recently had certain information from Palestine indicating the possibility of an assassination being carried out by the STEEL Group outside Palestine. This information comes from a [redacted] source

In this connection, one of the officers of the D.S.O. Palestine, learned at the end of October 1945, from a source described as reliable, that the JEFEN Group were proposing "to carry out the assassination of important personages in England". According to the D.S.O., the expression "important personages" referred to principal British supporters of the Arab cause, such as Major-General Spears, and not too Cabinet Ministers. The D.S.O.'s comment at the time was that the report might well be no more than a repetition of former rumours on the same subject.

I have passed the above information to the Colonial Office and to Mr. Canning, Special Branch, New Scotland Yard.

Yours

Then

J. C. Robertson,  
Major.

T.E. Bromley, Esq.,  
FOREIGN OFFICE.

h



Downing Street,  
S.W.1.

19th January, 1946.

C.10(J)6.

Dear Vincent,

I think you should know that in an illegal broadcast in Palestine on 17th December the Stern Group issued a violent denunciation of the Anglo-American Committee. The broadcast stated that the Group would appear before the Committee united, like the fighters of Madrid and Vienna or Tito's partisans, and would "speak to them in the language of the Hebrew fighter".

The Palestine authorities will, of course, take all possible security precautions during the visit of your Committee.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) J. M. MARTIN,

H. G. VINCENT, ESQ., C.B., C.V.O.



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TOP SECRET

30

85/22/11

C.S. 60/2/11

11th January, 1946.

Dear Trafford Smith,

Our representative in Palestine has informed us that the Stern Group in an illegal broadcast on December 17th issued a violent denunciation of the Anglo-American Commission. The broadcaster, after saying that the Group would appear before the Commission united, like the fighters of Madrid and Vienna, or Tito's partisans, continued: "The Enquiry Commission will come, and the Hebrew fighters will appear. There will be no value in what the Jews from Hebron or Rehavia (i.e. the Jewish Agency) say. The fighters will appear united.....and we shall speak to them in our own language - the language of the Hebrew fighter."

This information has been passed to the High Commissioner who considered it important.

Apart from the rather vague threats quoted above, a report from [ ] indicates the possibility of an assassination being carried out by the Stern Group outside Palestine, and suggests the Foreign Secretary as a possible target. In this connection, one of the officers of D.S.O. Palestine learned at the end of October 1945, from a source described as "reliable", that the STERN Group were proposing "to carry out the assassination of important personages in England". According to the D.S.O., the expression "important personages" referred to principal British supporters of the Arab cause such as Major General Spears, and not to Cabinet Ministers.

Trafford Smith Esq.,  
Colonial Office.

/The D.S.O.'s

BIB  
4/8  
12/1



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The D.S.O's comment on this report was that it might well be no more than a repetition of former rumours on the same subject.

One more fact of interest recently reported, is that a pamphlet was issued in Jerusalem on December 31st by the Stern Group in memory of a terrorist killed in the attack (thought to have been carried out by the Irgun) on C.I.D. Headquarters in Jerusalem on December 27th. This tends to confirm a recent statement that both the terrorist organisations were concerned in the attacks on the police stations.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) J.C. Robertson

J.C. Robertson, Major  
for A.J. Kellar.



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S. Form 100.

SECRET TELEGRAM RECEIVED IN CIPHER

From : DSO PALESTINE Office File No. \_\_\_\_\_ Originator's No. DSO/345  
Passed for Action to B.1.B Date of Origin 5.1.46  
Date of Receipt 7.1.46  
Copies to \_\_\_\_\_ Deciphered by NCM

ROBERTS.

Personal KELLAR repeated ROBERTS from ISHAM.

for first time reports possibility assassination being carried out by LHI outside Palestine. Foreign Secretary possible target. Previous report this nature came from NEWRIZ see our DSO/248 of october 26th 1945.

NEWRIZ

Sa 23A

not recd.

The text of this telegram is Unparaphrased, and must not be distributed outside British Government Departments or Headquarters, or re-transmitted, even in cipher, without being Paraphrased. Messages marked 'O.T.P.' need not be paraphrased.

(38943) WL49332/3295 20.000 1/43 A. & E.W.L.M. Op.498 J.7261



2.1.1.

You will remember that the Director General wrote to Sir Alexander Maxwell on April 2nd, 1945, drawing his attention to the possibility that members of the Jewish terrorist organisations might attempt the assassination of certain political personages in the U.K. (a copy of his letter is at 8a in OF.85/22(1)).

Since that date, confirmatory information of the possibility of terrorist activities in this country has been scanty. There have, however, been a few straws in the wind which have, I think, at least shown us to have been justified in the precautionary measures which we have taken. For example, Rafael SADOWSKY, a member of the Stern Group who was arrested and interrogated in Cairo in April this year, stated that BETSURY (one of the murderers of Lord Moyne) had told him in November last year that as soon as he returned to Stern Group headquarters he proposed to suggest a plan for the assassination of highly placed British political personalities, including Mr. Churchill, for which purpose emissaries should be sent to London.

In a conversation with Major Prendergast, stated that, although he doubted if the terrorists would undertake any activities in the U.K., he was nevertheless "rather worried" lest any of their number should reach this country. A telegram from SIME dated October 2nd, 1945 informed us that investigations into Jewish terrorist activities in Alexandria had shown one of the ringleaders there to be a certain Erik GERSHMAN, an Egyptian student, who had applied for a U.K. visa for the purpose of continuing his studies in England. (Arrangements have been made for the visa to be refused.) Finally, the D.S.O. Palestine telegraphed us on 28th October to state that Capt. NEWMAN (one of his officers formerly in the Palestine police) had learned that the Stern Group proposes "to carry out the assassination of important personages in England." The D.S.O. commented on this information that NEWMAN himself considered his source to be reliable, but that the report may well be nothing more than a repetition of former rumours.

The above information does not, as you will see, amount to very much. It does, however, I think justify us in assuming that the danger of attempts on the lives of important people here is still one with which we must reckon carefully. The comment by SIME in a letter dated June 1st, 1945 is probably a fair one: "It is quite clear that the terrorists may consider the extension of their activities to the U.K., and while we have no reliable evidence to suggest that they are doing this at the present moment, the recent institution of the more careful visa control of Jewish travellers is a reasonable precaution."

As you know, we have done considerably more than control applications for visas to the U.K. Our arrangements with the Home Office have enabled us to scrutinise the bona fides of all

/Jens

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la  
Jews arriving legally in this country ex Mideast (including seamen), while measures concerted with SIME, AFHQ and especially Hq. B.A.O.R. have, we hope, made it as difficult as possible for any Jewish terrorist in the Forces to reach this country whether on leave or on duty.

It is nevertheless clear that however much we do to control the movements of Jews travelling with proper documentation and in their real identity, our defence system cannot possibly be proof against individuals who may attempt to come here illegally. No vetting system, visa control or port control can meet the problem of - for example - the Jewish deserter from the Armed Forces, the absconding seaman or the stowaway.

There must therefore remain a small residue of danger which we cannot eliminate. With this in mind, it has occurred to me (and I have discussed this with Mr. Kellar) that you might think it advisable to acquaint Deputy Assistant Commissioner Canning - by letter or, preferably, in person - of the up to date position as summarised above. It is clearly not for us to suggest any measures that Special Branch might take to meet the "residue of danger" which I have suggested may exist. With the present facts before him, however, Canning may wish to consider - if he has not already done so - the possibility of special precautionary measures for the period of tension which we must expect to follow the announcement of H.M.G.'s decision on Palestine.

B. 1. B.  
31.10.45.

J.C. Robertson,  
Major