May 31,2009 Update

Man, 85, Avoids Jail Time for Giving Military Secrets 

By BENJAMIN WEISER

A case that surprised many with allegations of espionage and even talk of the death penalty ended Friday with an 85-year-old New Jersey man hobbling out of the federal district courthouse in Manhattan, avoiding prison but fined $50,000.With harsh words for both the man, Ben-Ami Kadish, and the government, the judge, William H. Pauley III, said prison would “serve no purpose” for a man so old and infirm, but made clear that he had lingering questions about the government’s approach to the case. Mr. Kadish, who lives with his wife of 57 years in a retirement community in Monroe Township, N.J., said in court that he leaked classified United States military documents to an Israeli agent in the early 1980s. But he was not arrested until last year, and was allowed to plead guilty to one count of conspiracy to act as an unregistered agent of Israel.“This offense is a grave one that implicates the national security of the United States,” Judge Pauley said, adding, “Why it took the government 23 years to charge Mr. Kadish is shrouded in mystery.”He also wondered why Mr. Kadish had been allowed to plead guilty to a single charge that seemed to understate the seriousness of his crime.“It’s clear,” Judge Pauley said, “that the government could have charged Mr. Kadish with far more serious crimes.”At one point, Judge Pauley questioned a prosecutor about the 23-year “hiatus,” as he put it, in the bringing of charges.The prosecutor, Iris Lan, said that it was not until last year that the F.B.I. had been able to “put all the pieces together.”“There’s no mystery behind it,” Ms. Lan said. “It’s just what happened.”“It’s a mystery to me,” Judge Pauley said tartly. “I’m wondering what happened.”Indeed, the gap of time between the activity and Mr. Kadish’s arrest lent an almost anachronistic air to the case, which, in fact, is tangentially tied to the notorious matter of Jonathan Jay Pollard, a former naval analyst who was sentenced to life in prison in 1987 for spying for Israel.Prosecutors have said that the Israeli agent, who photographed the documents at Mr. Kadish’s house, also received classified material from Mr. Pollard. Phone records reviewed by the F.B.I. showed at least 22 calls from the Israeli agent, who has since been identified as Yosef Yagur, to Mr. Kadish from July through November 1985, according to a criminal complaint.Mr. Kadish’s lawyer Jack T. Litman said that the government had those records years ago, “and apparently nobody followed up on them at the time.”Mr. Kadish, a United States Army Air Corps veteran, was born in Connecticut, and moved as a child to what was then Palestine and is now Israel, according to a document filed by his lawyer. He returned to the United States after World War II. From 1963 until 1990, he worked as a mechanical engineer at the Army’s Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center at the Picatinny Arsenal in Dover, N.J., the complaint said. When Mr. Kadish, who had a security clearance, was arrested in April 2008 and accused of spying, prosecutors said that he had provided Mr. Yagur with 50 to 100 classified documents, all of which he had borrowed from the arsenal’s library.One document contained information about nuclear weaponry, another concerned a modified version of an F-15 fighter jet and another pertained to the Patriot missile air defense system, the complaint said. Mr. Kadish has said he did not ask for nor did he receive anything of value for the documents.“I’m sorry I made a mistake,” Mr. Kadish, standing with the aid of a cane, told the judge before sentencing. “It was a misjudgment. I thought I was helping the state of Israel without harming the United States.”The prosecutor, Ms. Lan, told the judge that one reason her office had accepted a plea bargain was that Mr. Kadish had met with prosecutors, admitted to his wrongdoing, “and attempted to cooperate.”A spokesman for the Israeli Embassy in Washington had no comment on the sentencing. Mr. Kadish sat quietly through much of the proceeding, appearing to doze off briefly at one point. As the hearing ended, Judge Pauley said that he was imposing the $50,000 fine “because you have the ability to pay it, and it can communicate to you something more about the gravity of your offense.”
Judge Pawley ordered that he pay the fine within 60 days.“No problem,” Mr. Kadish said.(NY Times)

John Marshall Mantel for The New York Times
Ben-Ami Kadish must pay a $50,000 fine within 60 days. 

December 30,2008 Update

Ex-Army engineer pleads guilty to spy charge
By LARRY NEUMEISTER – 4 hours ago 

NEW YORK (AP) — An 85-year-old former Army mechanical engineer has pleaded guilty to conspiracy, admitting that he passed classified documents to the Israelis in the 1970s and '80s.Ben-ami Kadish entered the plea Tuesday in federal court in Manhattan and is to be sentenced in February. A prosecutor says the government will not oppose a sentence that calls for no prison time.Kadish pleaded guilty to only one of the four conspiracy charges he originally faced.Kadish was accused of taking home classified documents from 1979 to 1985 when he worked at an Army base in New Jersey. The government said he let an unidentified Israeli agent photograph the documents in his basement. Those documents included information about nuclear weapons. 

Israel Spy in US Arrest by FBI
Man Arrested for Disclosing Nuclear Defense Information to Israel 

Press release from the US Department of Justice 

Michael J. Garcia, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Mark J. Mershon, the Assistant Director-in-Charge of the New York Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), and Weysan Dun, the Special Agent-in-Charge of the Newark Office of the FBI, in conjunction with the U.S. Army, announced today the arrest of Ben-Ami Kadish on charges that he participated in a conspiracy to disclose to the Government of Israel documents related to the national defense of the United States and, in connection with that unauthorized disclosure, that he participated in a conspiracy to act as an agent of the Government of Israel. According to the Complaint filed in Manhattan federal court: 

From about 1979 through 1985, Kadish, a citizen of the United States, was a mechanical engineer, employed at the U.S. Army’s Armament Research, Development, and Engineering Center at the Picatinny Arsenal in Dover, New Jersey (the “Arsenal”). The Arsenal kept a library of documents with classified information related to the national defense of the United States (the “Library”). 

On numerous occasions during this time period, Kadish borrowed classified documents (the “Classified Documents”) from the Library and took the Classified Documents to his residence in New Jersey (the “Residence”). At the Residence, Kadish would then provide the Classified Documents to a co-conspirator not named herein as a defendant (“CC-1”), who would photograph the Classified Documents in the basement of the Residence. 

From at least 1980 through 1985, CC-1, a citizen of Israel, was employed by the Government of Israel as the Consul for Science Affairs at the Israeli Consulate General in Manhattan and directed Kadish to provide the Classified Documents to him (CC-1). 

One of the Classified Documents that Kadish provided to CC-1 contained information concerning nuclear weaponry and was classified as “Restricted Data,” a specific designation by the U.S. Department of Energy, because the document contained atomic-related information. 

Another one of the Classified Documents that Kadish provided CC-1 contained information concerning a major weapons system — a modified version of an F-15 fighter jet that the United States had sold to another country. This document was classified by the Department of Defense as “Secret” and was further restricted as “Noforn,” or “Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals.” 

Another one of the Classified Documents borrowed by Kadish from the Arsenal Library contained information concerning a major weapons system and major element of defense strategy — the U.S. Patriot missile air defense system. This document was classified by the Department of Defense as “Secret.” 

On March 20, 2008, Kadish and CC-1 had a telephone conversation, during which CC-1 instructed Kadish to lie to federal law enforcement officials. The following day, during an interview with the FBI, Kadish denied having had the telephone conversation with CC-1. 

Kadish is charged with four counts: one count of conspiring to disclose documents related to the national defense of the United States to the Government of Israel; one count of conspiring to act as an agent of the Government of Israel; one count of conspiring to hinder a communication to a law enforcement officer; and one count of conspiring to make a materially false statement to a law enforcement officer. 

Kadish is scheduled to appear this afternoon before United States Magistrate Judge Douglas F. Eaton in Manhattan federal court. 

Mr. Garcia praised the FBI and the U.S. Army for their efforts in this continuing investigation. 

Source (PDF) 

Ben-Ami Kadish, a former mechanical engineer at a U.S. Army arsenal, is escorted from federal court in New York. 
Photo Credit: By Frank Franklin Ii -- Associated Press Photo 
Criminal Complaint

US District Court-Southern District of New York 

United States of America v. Ben-Ami Kadish, Defendant: Sealed Complaint. New York: April 21, 2008. 

========== 

Count 1 

Approved: [signed] Iris Lan, Assistant US Attorney 

Before: Douglas F. Eaton, US Magistrate Judge, Southern District of New York 

Violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 794 and 1001, 1512 

County of Offense: New York 

Southern District of New York, ss.: Lance A. Ashworth, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is a Special Agent of the FBI ("FBI"), and charges as follows: 

(1) From at least in or about 1979, through and including in or about 1985, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, Ben-Ami Kadish, the defendant, and others known and unknown, unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly combined, conspired, confederated, and agreed together and with each other to communicate, deliver and transmit, directly and indirectly, to a foreign government, faction 
and party thereof, and to representatives, officers, agents, employees, citizens and subjects thereof, documents and information relating to the national defense, with the intent and reason to believe that they would be used to the injury of the US and to the advantage of a foreign nation, specifically, the Government of Israel, contrary to Title 18, US Code, Section 794(a). 

Count One: Overt Acts. 

(2) In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the illegal object thereof, the following overt acts, among others, were committed in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere: (a) On numerous occasions from in or about at least 1979 through in or about 1985, a co-conspirator not named as a defendant herein ("CC-1") provided Ben-Ami Kadish, the defendant, with lists of classified documents related to national defense (the "Classified Documents") for Kadish to obtain from the US Army's Armament Research, Development, and Engineering 
Center at the Picatinny Arsenal in Dover, New Jersey(the "Arsenal"). (b) On numerous occasions from in or about at least 1979 through in or about 1985, Kadish removed the Classified Documents from the Arsenal and took the Classified Documents to his residence in New Jersey (the "Residence"). (c) On numerous occasions from in or about at least 1980 through in or about 1985, CC-1 called Kadish from his (CC-1's) residence located in the Riverdale Section of the Bronx in order to arrange the Visits. (Title 18, US Code, Section 794(c).)

Count Two. 

(3) From in or about 1979 through and including on or about 3/20/2008, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, Ben-Ami Kadish, the defendant, and others known and unknown, unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly did combine, conspire, confederate, and agree together and with each other to commit an offense against the US, to wit, to violate Section 951 of Title 18, US Code. 

(4) It was a part and an object of the conspiracy that Ben-Ami Kadish, the defendant, and others known and unknown, unlawfully, willfully and knowingly would and did act in the US as agents of a foreign government, specifically, the Government of Israel, without prior notification to the Attorney General, as required by law, in violation of Title 18, US Code, Section 951. 

Count Two: Overt Acts. 

(5) In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the illegal object thereof, the following overt acts, among others, were committed in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere: (a) On numerous occasions from in or about at least 1979 through in or about 1985, a co-conspirator not named as a defendant herein ("CC-1") provided Ben-Ami Kadish, the defendant, with lists of classified documents related to national defense (the "Classified Documents") for Kadish to obtain from the US Army's Armament Research, Development, and Engineering 
Center at the Picatinny Arsenal in Dover, New Jersey (the "Arsenal"). (b) On numerous occasions from in or about at least 1979 through in or about 1985, Kadish removed the Classified Documents from the Arsenal and took the Classified Documents to his residence in New Jersey (the "Residence"). 

(c) On numerous occasions from in or about at least 1980 through in or about 1985, CC-1 visited Kadish at the Residence in order to photograph the Classified Documents (the "Visits"). (d) On numerous occasions from in or about at least 1980 through in or about 1985, CC-1 called Kadish from his (CC-1's) residence located in the Riverdale Section of the Bronx in order to arrange the Visits. (e) On numerous occasions from in our about 1985 through on or about 3/20/2008, Kadish engaged in telephone and email conversations with CC-1. In order to maintain and conceal his status as an agent of the Government of Israel, Kadish did not inform the Attorney General or any other US law enforcement agency about his ongoing contacts with CC-1 and his provision of the Classified Documents to CC-1. (f) On or about 3/20/2008, CC-1 telephoned Kadish, and CC-1 instructed Kadish to lie to US law enforcement agents. (g) On or about 3/21/2008, Kadish lied to FBI agents about his recent communications with CC-1. (Title 18, US Code, Section 371.) 

Count Three. 

(6) From on or about 3/20/2008 through on or about 3/21/2008, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, Ben-Ami Kadish, the defendant, and others known and unknown, unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly combined, conspired, confederated, and agreed together and with each other to knowingly and willfully make a materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive branch of the Government of the US, contrary to Title 18, US Code, Section 1001(a)(2). 

Count Three: Overt Acts. 

(7) In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the illegal object thereof, the following overt acts, among others, were committed in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere: (a) On or about 3/20/2008, after law enforcement officials (the "Law Enforcement officials") interviewed Ben-Ami Kadish, the defendant, (the "First 
Interview"), in connection with a Southern District of New York Federal grand jury investigation into espionage offenses (the "Grand Jury Investigation"), Kadish received a telephone call from a co-conspirator not named as a defendant herein ("CC-1"), and CC-1 instructed Kadish to lie to the Law Enforcement Officials. (b) On or about 3/21/2008, the Law Enforcement Officials interviewed Kadish again in connection with the Grand Jury Investigation, and during this interview, Kadish stated that he (Kadish) did not speak with CC-1 after the First Interview. (Title 18, US Code, Sections 371 and 1001(a)(2).) 

Count Four. 

(8) From on or about 3/20/2008 through on or about 4/21/2008, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, Ben-Ami Kadish, the defendant, and a co-conspirator not named as a defendant herein ("CC-1") unlawfully, wilfully, and knowingly combined, conspired, 
confederated, and agreed together and with each other to engage in misleading conduct toward another person with intent to hinder, delay, and prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer of information relating to the commission and possible commission of a Federal offense, contrary to Title 18, US Code, Section 1512(b)(3). 

Count Four: Overt Acts. 

(9) In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the illegal object thereof, the following overt acts, among others, were committed in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere: (a) On or about 3/20/2008, after law enforcement officials (the "Law Enforcement Officials") interviewed Ben-Ami Kadish, the defendant, (the "First 
Interview"), in connection with a Southern District of New York Federal grand jury investigation into espionage offenses (the "Grand Jury Investigation"), Kadish received a telephone call from a co-conspirator not named as a defendant herein ("CC-1"), and CC-1 instructed Kadish to lie to the Law Enforcement Officials. (b) On or 
about 3/21/2008, the Law Enforcement Officials interviewed Kadish again in connection with the Grand Jury Investigation, and during this interview, Kadish stated that he (Kadish) did not speak with CC-1 after the First Interview. (Title 18, US Code, Section 1512(k).) 

The bases for my knowledge and for the foregoing charges are, in part, as follows: 

(10) I am a Special Agent of the FBI, and I have been involved in the investigation of the above-described offenses. As set forth more fully below, this Complaint is based, among other things, on my training and experience; my personal participation in this investigation; witness interviews I have conducted; and documents I have reviewed. 

(11) Because this affidavit is being submitted for the limited purpose of demonstrating probable cause, it does not include details of every aspect of my investigation. Where I relate statements, conversations, and actions are related in substance and in part, except where otherwise indicated. Similarly, where I describe documents, the content of the documents is related in substance and in part, except where otherwise indicated. 

Ben-Ami Kadish. 

(12) At all times material to the allegations contained in this Complaint: (a) Ben-Ami Kadish, the defendant, is a US citizen, who was born in Connecticut. From in or about 10/1963 to in or about 1/1990, Kadish was employed as a mechanical engineer at the US Army's Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center at the Picatinny Arsenal in Dover, New Jersey (the "Arsenal"). (b) In his 
capacity as a mechanical engineer at the Arsenal, Kadish received security clearances in order to have access to classified documents and information. Specifically, Kadish received a "Secret" security clearance on 10/22/1963, and maintained that clearance throughout his term of employment with the Arsenal. (c) At no time during his 
employment with the Arsenal was Kadish ever authorized, directly or indirectly, to deliver, communicate, or transmit classified information or documents to representatives, officers, agents, employees, subjects, and citizens of the Government of Israel, faction or party thereof. 

The Co-Conspirator. 

(13) At all times material to the allegations contained in this Complaint: (a) A co-conspirator not named as a defendant herein ("CC-1") was born in Israel and is a citizen of Israel. (b) During at least in or about the late 1970s, CC-1 was employed at the Israeli Aerospace Industries, then known as the Israeli Aircraft Industries, ("IAI"), in Israel. Since at least in or about the late 1970s, IAI has been a defense manufacturing contractor for the Israeli government. (c) From in or about 7/1980 through in or about 11/1985, CC1 was employed by the Government of Israel as the Consul for Science Affairs at the Israeli Consulate General in Manhattan, New York (the "Israeli Consulate"). While he was employed at the Israeli Consulate, CC-1 resided in the Riverdale section of Bronx, New York (the "Riverdale Residence"). (d) In or about 11/1985, Jonathan Jay Pollard was charged with espionage-related offenses in relation to his having provided classified information to CC-1, among other people. (e) In or about 11/1985, CC-1 left the US and has not returned to the US. (f) CC-1 has never received security clearances in order to have access to any documents and information classified by the US government. 

Control of Classified Information and Documents. 

(14) Pursuant to Executive Order 12356, as superseded by Executive Order 12958 and amended by Executive Order 13292, (the "Order"), classified information is defined as information in any form that (1) is owned by, produced by or for, or under the control of the US Government; (2)falls within one or more of the categories set forth in Section 1.5 of the Order; and (3) is classified by an original classification authority who determines that its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security. Among the categories of information set out in Section 1.5 of the Order is information concerning military plans, weapons systems, or operations (1.5(a)); foreign government information (1.5(b)); intelligence activities, including intelligence sources and methods (1.5(c)); and foreign relations or foreign activities of the US, including confidential sources (1.5(d)). 

(15) The Order mandates that information requiring protection for reasons of national security be classified at one of three levels: "Top Secret," "Secret," or "Confidential." The designation "Top Secret" applies to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security. The designation "Secret" applies to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to national security. Access to classified information at any level may be further restricted through compartmentation in "Sensitive Compartmented Information" ("SCI") categories. Dissemination of classified information at any levels may be further restricted through caveats such as "Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals" ("NOFORN"). 

(16) Classified information, of any designation, may only be shared with persons determined by an appropriate US government official to be eligible for access to classified information, who have signed an approved non-disclosure agreement, and who possess a need to know the 
content of the classified information. If a person is not eligible to receive classified information, classified information may not be disclosed to that person. 

The Conspiracies. 

(17) Based on information obtained from the Arsenal, I have learned that from at least in or about 1970 through in or about 1985: (a) The Arsenal kept a library of documents (the "Library"), which included numerous documents with classified information related to the 
national defense of the US. (b) In order to borrow documents with classified information from the Library, the Arsenal required its employees to complete and sign a form called the "Classified Document Accountability Record," ("CDAR Form") which listed, among other things, the title and classification of each of the documents being signed out on a given date. The borrower was then given a copy of the CDAR Form. (c) From at least on or about 8/23/1979, through on or about 7/15/1984, Ben-Ami Kadish, the defendant, signed at least 24 CDAR Forms, showing that Kadish borrowed at least 35 classified documents (the "Classified Documents") from the Library at the Arsenal. 

(18) Each of the Classified Documents contained information related to the national defense of the US. For example: (a) One of the Classified Documents contained information concerning nuclear weaponry and was classified as "Restricted Data," a specific designation by the US Department of Energy, because the document contained atomic-related information (the "Restricted Data Document"). Ben-Ami Kadish, the defendant, was not authorized to view the Restricted Data Document, or to borrow it from the Library because, among other things, his clearance level (i.e., "Secret") did not permit Kadish to view the Restricted Data Document. (b) Another one of the Classified Documents contained information concerning a major weapons system, i.e., information regarding a modified version of an F-15 fighter jet that the US had sold to another foreign country (the "F-15 Document"). the F-15 Document was classified by the Department of Defense as "Secret" and was further restricted as "NOFORN", or "Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals." (c) Another one 
of the Classified Documents contained information concerning a major weapons system and a major element of defense strategy, i.e., information regarding the US Patriot missile air defense system (the "Patriot Document"). The Patriot Document was classified by the 
Department of Defense as "Secret." 

(19) On or about 3/20/2008, another law enforcement agent and I interviewed Ben-Ami Kadish, the defendant, at an FBI office in New Jersey (the "First Interview"). Kadish stated, in substance and in part, the following: (a) Sometime in the 1970s, after Kadish had begun working at the Arsenal, and while CC-1 was still employed at IAI, Kadish was introduced to CC-1 by Kadish's brother, who was one of CC-1's then-co-workers at IAI. Specifically, Kadish and CC-1 met in person in the New York City area (the "Initial Meeting"). (b) At the Initial Meeting, CC-1 did not ask Kadish to provide him (CC-1) with access to any classified documents. In numerous subsequent meetings, CC-1 asked, and Kadish agreed, to provide him (CC-1) with 
classified documents that would help protect Israel. (c) Kadish obtained classified documents for CC-1 from the Library at the Arsenal. Kadish did not choose the classified documents that he retrieved from the Arsenal. Rather, CC-1 provided Kadish with lists of specific items to obtain from the Library, which Kadish would then 
borrow from the Library. (d) Kadish borrowed the classified documents from the Library by signing CDAR Forms. After borrowing the classified documents from the Library, Kadish would take them back to his office at the Arsenal, put them into his briefcase, and take them 
at the end of the work day to the residence in New Jersey where he (Kadish) was then living (the "Residence"). CC-1 would later call Kadish and then travel to the Residence, where CC-1 would take photographs of the classified documents in the basement of the Residence. Kadish knew that he (CC-1) photographed the classified documents in the basement. The next morning, Kadish would take the classified documents back to the Arsenal and return them to the Library. (e) During the First Interview, I showed Kadish classified documents that the FBI had obtained from the Arsenal, including the Restricted Data Document and the F-15 Document. Kadish confirmed that he had borrowed the Classified Documents for CC-1, signed the CDAR Forms to obtain the Classified Documents, and provided CC-1 with access to the Classified Documents. (f) Kadish recognized the Restricted Data Document and confirmed that he knew at the time that he made it available to CC-1 that (1) the Restricted Data Document included atomic-related information; (2) he (Kadish) did not have the requisite clearance nor the necessary need to know in order to borrow the document from the Library; and (3) he (Kadish) had provided CC-1 with access to the Restricted Data Document. (g) Kadish recognized the F-15 document and confirmed that he had obtained the F-15 Document for CC-1 because it had a direct correlation to Israel's security. (h) In total, Kadish provided CC-1 with approximately 50 to 100 classified documents, all of which were borrowed from the Library at the Arsenal. (i) Kadish said he (Kadish) believed that providing classified documents to CC-1 would help Israel. (j) Kadish is no longer living at the Residence. In or about 1995, he (Kadish) moved to another location in New Jersey, where he (Kadish) has since resided (the "Current Residence"). (k) During the First Interview, I also gave to Kadish my business card, which stated that I was an FBI special agent working within the Southern District of New York. 

(20) On or about 3/20/2008, after the First Interview with the FBI, CC-1 called a telephone number associated with the Current Residence of Ben-Ami Kadish, the defendant, and spoke with Kadish (the "Telephone Conversation"). During the Telephone Conversation, CC-1 instructed Kadish to lie to law enforcement officials. For example, CC-1 stated: "Don't say anything. Let them say whatever they want. You didn't...do anything.... What happened 25 years ago? You didn't remember anything." [The information set forth in this paragraph is based on a preliminary translation of the Telephone Call, which was conducted primarily in Hebrew.] 

(21) On or about 3/21/2008, another law enforcement agent and I interviewed Ben-Ami Kadish, the defendant, (the "Second Interview"), at Kadish's Current Residence. Kadish stated, in substance and in part, the following: (a) CC-1 never paid him (Kadish) money to obtain classified documents. Rather, CC-1 gave Kadish small gifts and occasionally bought dinner for Kadish and his family at a restaurant in the Riverdale section of the Bronx. (b) Kadish and CC-1 have kept in touch since CC-1's departure from the US in 1985. Kadish and CC-1 have primarily maintained contact by telephone and e-mail, and in 2004, they saw each other in person in Israel. According to Kadish, all of their contacts after 1985 have been for purely social reasons. (c) Kadish did not speak with CC-1 after the First Interview with the FBI. 

(22) On or about 3/21/2008, prior to the Second Interview, a subpoena was issued on behalf of a grand jury sitting in the Southern District of New York (the "Subpoena"). The Subpoena was addressed to Ben-Ami Kadish, the defendant, but was not served on him at the Second Interview. 

(23) Based on a review of telephone records, I have learned the following: (a) From at least in or about 7/1985 through in or about 11/1985, at least 22 telephone calls were placed from the Riverdale Residence of CC-1 to the telephone number associated with the Residence, where Ben-Ami Kadish, the defendant, was then living. 

Wherefore, deponent prays that warrants be issued for the arrest of Ben-Ami Kadish, the defendant, and that he be arrested and imprisoned, or bailed, as the case may be. 

[signed] Lance A. Ashworth, Special Agent, FBI 

Sworn to before me 4/21/2008. 

[signed] Douglas F. Eaton, US Magistrate Judge, Southern District of New York.

Source (PDF) 

Israeli Spy Case Will Name More Spies 

by Philip Giraldi 

*Philip Giraldi, a former CIA officer, is a partner in Cannistraro Associates, an international security consultancy. This news article
was adapted from  the Web site of The American Conservative magazine (www.amconmag.com). 

Israeli sources are reporting that the FBI investigation of the Ben-Ami Kadish spy case resulted from a leak coming from inside the government of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. The information on Kadish and on a number of other Americans who have spied for Israel was provided to the FBI anonymously, leading to the Bureau’s opening of a full investigation. One source reports that the National Security Agency was provided with Yosef Yagur’s current phone number and address and was able to obtain corroborating information on the case by tapping the phone. Yagur, who is now living in Israel, was Kadish’s case officer, handling the cases of both him and Jonathan Pollard. Before the anonymous leak of information, the FBI had no idea that Kadish had been a spy for Israel. Now it is investigating a number of US citizens, including an individual who held very senior positions in the Clinton and Bush White Houses. 

The leak of the information at the present time is believed to be linked to proposed closed congressional hearings at the end of this month in which the White House had planned to use several Israeli intelligence officers to provide evidence on the alleged Syrian nuclear program that was bombed on September 6, 2007. It is now unlikely that Israeli intelligence officers will allow themselves to be questioned because they would almost certainly be asked about Israeli spying on the US. Vice President Dick Cheney and Olmert had apparently planned on using the congressional briefings as a launch pad to intensify diplomatic and military pressure against both Syria and Iran. It is believed that the “doves” in the Olmert administration who leaked the information are seeking to make a military confrontation more difficult and are hoping that negotiations, particularly with Syria, will instead take place. The revelation of more Israeli spying will also make it more difficult for Jonathan Pollard to be released from prison. There has been speculation that President Bush would pardon him before leaving office as a favor to Israel and the neocons. 

Source